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Resurgent Parenthood: Organic
Domestic Ideals and the Southern
Family Roots of Conservative
Ascendancy, 1980–2005
Gwendoline M. Alphonso
Fairfield University
Accounts that focus on the “southernization” of the Republican Party and the sub-
sequent conservative ascendance in American party politics emphasize the role of
race and civil rights issues, or battles over sex and gender, but none analyze the
significance of family in shaping this partisan rightward shift. Meanwhile, literatures
in fields other than party politics have engaged family more centrally, highlighting the
rising salience of parents to legal and political development. This article connects and
contributes to these literatures by analyzing the impact of parenthood and family on
political party development. I demonstrate the increasing salience of “parents” as a
political ideal in late twentieth-century policy discourse, reveal an overarching
organic family frame in which it was used, and trace this frame to Southern domestic
ideals and to the growing importance of the South to the Republican Party. In so
doing I provide a “family-centered” account of the late twentieth-century conservative
ascendancy and suggest the centrality of family – and parenthood – in defining it.
Keywords family politics; American political development; history of political
parties; conservatism; U.S. South
Party politics in the last five decades is conventionally explained as a result of the
transition of southern whites from the Democratic to the Republican Party. In many
accounts the shift in Republican ideology was part of a long-term “Southern
Strategy” that began with the nomination of Barry Goldwater in 1964. Whereas
most accounts that focus on the “southernization” of the Republican Party and
subsequent conservative ascendance in American party politics emphasize the
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role of race and civil rights issues,1 others also connect the phenomenon to battles
over sex and gender.2 None, however, analyze the significance of family in shaping
this partisan rightward shift.
A growing corpus of literature in fields other than party politics engages family
more centrally, demonstrating the changes in law and society engendered by the
massive demographic transformations in the American family that began in the
1970s.3 One aspect that has been highlighted is the rising salience of parents in
legal and political development. Legal scholar June Carbone in her book From
Partners to Parents, describes a “second revolution in family law,” a paradigm
change that occurred as custody decisions shifted from emphasizing spousal
relationships to parental ones. She suggests that the fracturing of the nuclear family
led to an increased focus on parent–child relationships and asserts that “the code
of family responsibility is being written in terms of the only ties left – the ones to
children.”4 Other scholars stress the significance of the resurgent parent, as a
political subject, on other political developments. For instance, in the transforma-
tion of the gay rights movement into the marriage equality movement, advocates
are observed to have “put forth gay and lesbian couples as parents in order to
secure them legal rights as married partners.”5
1. For example, see Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of the Southern Republicans (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003); Joseph E. Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and
the Origins of Modern Conservatism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009); Dan T. Carter, From
George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race and the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963–1994 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1999.
2. See, for example, Robert Self, All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2012); Christina Wolbrecht, The Politics of Women’s Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Kira Sanbonmatsu, Democrats, Republicans and the
Politics of Women’s Place (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Jo Freeman, A Room at a Time:
How Women Entered Party Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Catherine E. Rymph,
Republican Women: Feminism and Conservatism from Suffrage Through the Rise of the New Right (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
3. See, for example, in history, Self, All in the Family (see previous note); J. Brooks Flippen, Jimmy
Carter, the Politics of the Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right (Atlanta: Georgia University Press, 2011);
Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History: From Obedience to Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage (New
York: Viking, 2005); Natasha Zaretsky, Direction Home: the American Family and the Fear of National
Decline, 1968–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). For a notable exception in
political science, see Patricia Strach, All in the Family: The Private Roots of American Public Policy,
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). For a comprehensive review of recent work on family in
political theory and American politics, see Brian Duff, “Family and Citizenship in Political Theory and
Political Science,” Journal of Family Theory & Review 6 (2014): 45–59.
4. June Carbone, From Partners to Parents: The Second Revolution in Family Law (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000), xiii.
5. Stu Marvel, “The Evolution of Plural Parentage: Applying Vulnerability Theory to Polygamy and
Same-Sex Marriage,” Emory Law Journal, 64 (2015): 2048–88, at 2054; and Yvonne Zylan, States of
Passion: Law, Identity and the Social Construction of Desire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011),
24–50.
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Political scientists document the current impact of parenthood on voting
behavior, political beliefs, and public opinion.6 Recent works, in particular,
suggest the durability of motherhood and shifts in it, as a frame for organizing
political participation and shaping political attitudes.7 Jill Greenlee, for instance,
finds that although “political parties continue to view women through the lens of
motherhood in presidential politics,” since the second-wave women’s movement,
motherhood has come to advocate “specific policy issues,” and is less a “general”
category of appeal in presidential campaigns.8
This article contributes to this literature on the changing impact of parenthood
and family by connecting it to political party development. I demonstrate the
increasing salience of “parents” as a political ideal in late twentieth century policy
discourse, reveal an overarching organic family frame in which it was used, and
trace this frame to southern domestic ideals and to the growing importance of the
South to the Republican Party. In so doing I provide a “family-centered” interpreta-
tion of the twentieth-century conservative ascendancy and suggest the centrality of
family – and parenthood – in defining it.
The narrative that follows is organized into two sections: the first uses evidence
from bill sponsorships and committee hearings to show how “family” and
“parents” were deployed by conservatives in the last two decades of the twentieth
century. The second section uses aggregate data compiled from real-life family
anecdotes cited by legislators during congressional committee hearings9 to
6. Laurel Elder and Steven Greene, The Politics of Parenthood: Causes and Consequences of the
Politicization and Polarization of the American Family (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012);
Robert Urbatsch, Families’ Values: How Parents, Siblings, and Children Affect Political Attitudes (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 21–42.
7. Jill S. Greenlee, The Political Consequences of Motherhood (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2014); Cynthia Stavrianos, The Political Uses of Motherhood in America (New York: Routledge, 2015);
Kristin A. Goss, The Paradox of Gender Equality: How American Women’s Groups Gained and Lost Their
Public Voice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013).
8. Greenlee, Political Consequences of Motherhood, 11, 72 (see previous note).
9. I located family-related hearings from 1980 to 2006 from the Congressional Universe database by
using family and domestic relations keywords comparable to those used in party platforms and bills,
yielding 554 family-related hearings. I manually examined hearing transcripts to identify real-life family
narratives. Each case when a member of Congress interacted with a family narrative through questions or
comments and raised a policy issue was coded as one case in the data set. By so doing I compiled a data
set of 1102 such family cases or anecdotes that members of Congress had referred to. I coded each case for
characteristics of the family: region and city of residence, family size, income, population density of city/
town of residence, addictions of family members, civic participation, receipt or not of welfare services,
religious identification, working and marital status of parents; I also coded the characteristics of the
congressperson, namely: party, committee name, state, and region. In this way, I am able to empirically
connect idealized family characteristics to members of Congress and, in the aggregate, to their parties. For
more on this methodology, details of findings in this and other historical periods, and my argument about
the development of family as an evolving political ideal across the Progressive, Post World War II, and late-
twentieth century periods, see Gwendoline Alphonso, Polarized Families, Polarized Politics: Sectional
Families, Political Parties & the Emergence of Culture Wars in America, 1900–2005 (University of
Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming).
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empirically demonstrate the roots of New Right Republican ideology in the
Southern family. By so doing, I provide an explanation of why parents emerged as
a central politicized ideal, suggesting that their heightened salience was a vital part
of the Republican southern strategy.
The Resurgence of Parents and the Revival of Southern
Organic Domestic Ideals
The late twentieth century witnessed the unraveling of the nuclear family. In 1960,
over 70% of American households were made up of a breadwinner father,
homemaker mother, and their biological children.10 Three decades later, such
“traditional” nuclear families accounted for less than 25% of the nation’s house-
holds.11 In what has been described as a massive “demographic transition,” the
United States moved from a period of relatively high fertility to one with rising
ages at marriage, growing rates of cohabitation, increases in single person house-
holds, declining remarriage rates, fertility postponement, and higher rates of
childlessness.12
Accompanying these demographic shifts, Republicans and Democrats increas-
ingly invoked the family as a frame for their policy agendas. As seen in Figure 1, the
parties increased their attention to the family beginning in 1968; by 2012, they had
tripled the proportion of platform paragraphs in which they addressed the family.13
A similar rise in attention occurred in congressional hearings. By the last
decade of the twentieth century, lawmakers were introducing an average of 125
family-related bills per Congress (1989–2004), compared with an average of
91 family bills per Congress in the immediate postwar period (1945–1954) and
49 such bills per Congress in the Progressive era (1899–1921).14
10. Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg, Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life
(New York: Free Press, 1988), 203.
11. Ibid., 203.
12. Ron Lesthaeghe and Lisa Niedert, “The Second Demographic Transition in the United States:
Exception or Textbook Example?” Population and Development Review 32 (December 2006): 669–98; see
also Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red v. Blue Families: Legal Polarization and the Creation of Culture
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 34–35.
13. I analyzed Republican and Democratic platforms from 1900 to 2012, yielding 58 primary
documents consisting of 17,489 paragraphs in all. Using the platform paragraph as my unit of analysis,
each was coded as a “family paragraph” if it addressed the family (as a unit, or parents, children, and
spouses as members of a family) through a coherent and discernable policy issue. I defined paragraphs as
being delimited by a hard return; thus, they were as short as one to two sentences or as long as many
sentences. I excluded planks that addressed women or children as individuals and not in their familial
capacity, relation, or role. For more details on the evolution of family as a policy issue in party platforms
and bill sponsorship, see Alphonso, Polarized Families, Chapter 1 (see note 9 above).
14. I identified family-related bills by examining each year’s Congressional Record Index and
searching under index headings that corresponded to family keywords found in concurrent platform
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Moreover, late twentieth century legislators focused on parenting more than
any other family issue. Through the 1990s, legislative bills addressed five policy
issues affecting the family: its sexuality, structure, parenting, property and wealth,
and public assistance.15 The single largest proportion (27%) of family bills
Figure 1
Family Paragraphs in Party Platforms as Percentage of Total Paragraphs
Source: Data compiled by author. N= 17,489. See note 13 above in the text of this article for more
information about methodology.
paragraphs. This yielded 538 bills for the Progressive era (1899–1920), 457 for the Postwar period
(1945–1954) and 1028 bills for the late twentieth century period (1989–2004). For instance, both parties’
platforms discussed the family in the early twentieth century in pledges on veterans’ pensions and
homestead policies. I consulted “pensions” and “public lands” headings in the Congressional Record
Indexes for the relevant periods.
The period since 1980 is unlike the others insofar as “the family” is now a separate heading in the annual
Congressional Record Index listings. In each era, I defined family narrowly and included only those bills
whose titles invoked a family relation (spouse, parents, dependents) or an aspect of family life (such as
marriage, pregnancy, or family property). For instance, bills whose titles and synopses referred to
“women” or “children” only generally and without mention of their family role or context were excluded.
It bears noting that the increase in family-related bills in the late twentieth century Congresses could
correlate to institutional developments in Congress, such as the increase in the number of subcommittees
following legislative reforms in the 1970s. See, for instance, Nelson Polsby, How Congress Evolves: Social
Bases of Institutional Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). However, the analysis of
institutional dynamics is outside the scope of the study. Instead, my objective is to describe the increased
policy attention to family and to analyze its partisan dynamics in terms of discourse, ideology, and politics.
Increased attention to family is corroborated by platform data, which shows that the parties increased
three-fold the percentage of their platforms devoted to family and family policy issues after 1968,
compared with the platforms in the 1900–1968 period.
15. N= 1028 family-related bills. Through a method of close induction and content analysis of bill
titles, I identified that these five categories were the most important ones and then coded each bill as
falling primarily in one or the other category.
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sponsored focused on parents, more than the share of bills that highlighted family
sexuality (11%), family structure (17 %), family property/wealth (14%), and even
public assistance (21%). Parenting thus emerged as a central policy issue of the
late twentieth century.
Many scholars have highlighted conservatives’ political turn to parents in this
period in terms of their privatization of the family and their advocacy of family
autonomy from the state. 16 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, for example, asserts
that religious and political conservatives view parents’ rights as “absolute” and
“inalienable…natural rights antedating the State.”17 Resembling the concerns of
parents in the Progressive era who had claimed that child labor laws, compul-
sory education, and vaccination legislation were “improper and unnecessary
usurpations of the God-given authority of parents to direct their children’s
upbringing,” Woodhouse writes in the mid 1990s, “today, we see…the same
tensions reflected in public debates over family values, children’s rights, state
intrusions on family prerogatives, and a new drive towards the privatization of
the family.”18
Indeed, in congressional hearings and through proposed legislation, Repub-
licans in the 1980s and 1990s resurrected parents as the “missing link” against the
state and represented parental authority as crucial to family autonomy. They
increasingly advocated that “government should adopt no policy that would
drive a wedge between husbands and wives or between parents and their
children.”19 Republican platforms through the 1980s and 1990s attacked
prevailing welfare, tax, abortion, education, and consumer laws as part of “the
liberal philosophy [that] has assaulted the family on every side,” inasmuch as it
“den[ies] parental authority and responsibility, fracturing the family into
isolated individuals, each of them dependent upon – and helpless before –
16. See, for example, Linda L. Lane, “The Parental Rights Movement,” University of Colorado Law
Review 69 (1998): 825–50, at 825. Feminist political theorists who highlight equality rightly critique the
assumption of family autonomy in liberal theory and emphasize the privatization aspects of family in
conservative political discourse, See, for example, Martha A. Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of
Dependency (New York: New Press, 2005); Maxine Eichner, The Supportive State: Families, Government,
and America’s Political Ideals (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Linda McClain in this symposium,
“The Family, the State, and American Political Development as a Big Tent: Asking Basic Questions about
Basic Institutions,” Polity 48 (2016): 224–42.
17. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “A Public Role in the Private Family: The Parental Rights and
Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and Education,” Ohio State Law Journal
57 (1996): 393–430, at 395.
18. Ibid., 395.
19. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Private Sector
Initiatives: Examination of the Private Sector Initiatives to Promote the Health and Wellbeing of American
Families, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1983, 1; on the importance of preserving family integrity and autonomy in
social policy also see, Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.), Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
Work Ethic: Materialism and the American Family, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, 7.
210 RESURGENT PARENTHOOD
This content downloaded from 064.202.087.206 on October 25, 2018 08:18:55 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
government.”20 Parental authority for Republican conservatives was thus crucial
to maintaining family as the “home of freedom” and limiting the reach of the
public sphere into the private.21
However, the enhanced political value of parents to late-twentieth-century
partisans extended beyond the anti-statist autonomy framework. Instead,
Republicans also created an ideal of parents as moral stewards of a traditional
social order, whose increased political worth flowed from their role as positive
guardians of that cherished order and not merely as negative actors limiting
the state. For example, Allan Carlson, director of the influential conservative
Rockford Institute and a frequent witness at congressional hearings, called
for a “turn to home,” because the “family was that social unit that reconciled
liberty with order, that kept individual’s interests in balance with the interests of
community and posterity.”22 During the same period, the communitarian
movement also insisted that “the extreme cultural emphasis in the United
States on individual rights, freedom, and self-fulfillment” now required “a
cultural shift back toward marital and parental responsibility.”23 Family and
state, or the private and public, comprised a nested hierarchy rather than
two distinct spheres, both overlapping in their collective defense of traditional
social order.
This conception of parents, as embedded within (and in service to) a public
social order, harkens less to the unmoored, autonomous family of neoliberalism
and more to the “organic model of the household” that legal historians have
attributed to the antebellum Old South.24 By paying attention to the influence of
this ideational variant of family, we see the deep regionalism of the New Right’s
conservative agenda and the centrality of family in tying together hierarchical
(racial and gendered) ideologies.
20. Republican Party Platforms: “Republican Party Platform of 1992,” in Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, The American Presidency Project, at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847, accessed August
15, 2015.
21. Ibid.
22. Allan C. Carlson, “The Family and the Constitution,” The Family in America 3 (1989): 1–8, at 8.
23. Don Browning, “When Theory Meets Practice: Communitarian Ethics and the Family,” in Marriage
in America: A Communitarian Perspective, ed. Martin King Whyte (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2000), 293–300, at 294. For communitarians, rights and responsibilities are “basic moral values”
that “should be balanced with one another…at all times and all places.” Individual-centered rights thus
needed to be counterbalanced against society-centered responsibilities. See Amitai Etizioni’s seminal
works The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (New York: Basic Books,
1996) and The Spirit of Community: Rights on Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda
(New York: Crown, 1993).
24. Peter Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the Nineteenth-Century
South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
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There is now an established body of literature that demonstrates historic and
ongoing regional differences in politicized family ideals.25 In the “contractual view
of domestic relations” emerging in the urbanizing North of the nineteenth century,
the family was an increasingly autonomous unit, in which the members of a
household (husband-wife, parent-child) were voluntarily “bound together by
egalitarianism and affection.” In contrast, an “organic domestic ideal” prevailed
in the antebellum rural South, based on “traditional notions of patriarchal authority
that stressed the importance of harmony, dependency, and hierarchy.”26 In the
Southern view, the household was “embedded in networks of blood, marriage,
and kinship [and] provided the key source of order and stability in southern
society.”27 Hierarchical domestic relations in the household, and foremost paternal
authority, reflected and reproduced the “organic hierarchy” that was the basis of
social order in the slaveholding South.28
Yet, the parental or patriarchal authority of the head of household was not
considered absolute or universal in the antebellum South. Instead, there existed a
widely prevalent “localized” Southern domestic ideology, wherein the authority of
patriarchs over their households, including paternal rights over children, was
subjected to a metaphorical social “peace,” an overarching “public order” that
permeated all southern domestic relations.29 The preoccupation with maintaining
this public order subjected individual parental authority to broader community
goals, such that the rights of patriarchs were upheld only in cases where they could
demonstrate fulfillment of “their allotted roles within their families and
25. On nineteenth-century differences in Northern and Southern family ideals and/or the distinctive-
ness of Southern family ideals, see Rebecca Edwards, Angels in the Machinery: Gender in American Party
Politics from the Civil War to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 12–38;
Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household, 82, 84, 117–19 (see previous note); Laura F. Edwards, The People
and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 169–86; and Kathleen M. Brown, Good Wives, Nasty
Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996). On regional family ideals in contemporary politics/policy, see Cahn and
Carbone, Red v. Blue Families (see note 12 above); and Nicole Mellow, The State of Disunion: Regional
Sources of Modern American Partisanship (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 179.
26. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household, xii (see note 24 above). Also, Rebecca Edwards contrasts
similar sectional family ideals in her assemblage of the “maternal family ideal” of Republican Protestant
Yankees in the nineteenth century, as differentiated from a southern-based Democratic family ideology
centered on “domestic male authority,” in Angels in the Machinery, 23 (see previous note).
27. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household, 23 (see note 24 above).
28. Ibid., 25
29. Edwards, The People and the Peace, 169–201 (see note 25 above). For work extending Edwards’s
argument to antebellum race determination and patriarchal authority in Louisiana, see Gwendoline Alphonso,
“Public & Private Order: Law, Race, Morality and the Antebellum Courts of Louisiana, 1830–1860,” Journal of
Southern Legal History 23 (2015): 117–60. See also Ariela Gross,What BloodWon’t Tell: A History of Race on Trial
in America (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008) on the importance of juries, social customs, and
norms in the determination of race-based patriarchal authority within the household.
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communities.”30 Parents, their authority and rights, were thus an organic part of the
all-encompassing preoccupation with public social order.
We see a similar focus on organic social order underlying the construction of
parents in policy discussions by late twentieth-century Republicans. In numer-
ous congressional hearings on “Teen Pregnancy,” “Absentee Fathers,” “Alcohol-
ism,” “Broken and Disrupted Families,” and “Youth Crime and Delinquency,”
parents were idealized not for their personal, inherently significant, affection or
commitment to their children (as per the Northern companionate, contractual
view of family). Rather, they were viewed more instrumentally: as moral
stewards of their children’s destinies, crucial to the continued order of the
community and even of the nation. As Senator Jeremiah Denton, newly elected
Republican from Alabama asserted in the early 1980s, “lack of parental super-
vision…affects the child’s future, well-being and citizenship in terms of his or her
self-respect and respect for authority, with consequent propensities toward
such miscreant behavior as alcohol and drug abuse, criminality, and even
disloyalty toward country.”31 In another hearing on Encouraging Responsible
Fatherhood, Dan Coats (R-Ind.), also first elected in 1980, highlighted the need to
restore the centrality of fathers and paternal authority in order to maintain
(traditional) social order, saying that “…a society of unattached males asks
for and gets chaos…when the role of fathers is respected and restored, a
neighborhood and a society becomes a better place to live.”32
Several newly elected Republican legislators of the New Right, many of them
from erstwhile Democratic districts in the South,33 now solicited the state to restore
parents’ traditional roles, to act as “social glue,” in the words of Dan Marriott
(R-Utah).34 Through programs such as parent education classes for teens, single
30. Edwards, People and their Peace, 112–13 (see note 25 above).
31. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee on Family and Human
Services, Broken Families: Oversight on the Breakdown of the Traditional Family Unit, Focusing on the
Effects of Divorce, Separation, and Conflict within Marriage on Children and on Women and Men, 98th Cong.,
1st sess., 1983, 3.
32. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee on Children and Families,
Encouraging Responsible Fatherhood: Examining Initiatives to Encourage Responsible Fatherhood, 104th
Congress, 2nd sess., 1996, 2.
33. Black and Black highlight the transformation of Southern representatives most clearly, starting
with presidential voting during the Goldwater campaign in 1964 and then in congressional voting and
partisan identification almost a generation later, beginning in the 1980s and surging in the 1990s in their
Rise of Southern Republicans, 11–20 (see note 1 above).
34. House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Improving American Education: Roles
for Parents, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, 8; see also witnesses’ remarks on how exactly parents fulfill social
role obligations – through “shared governance,” learning “new parenting skills,” and so on 10, 41. In this
way, Republican members of Congress (and the antebellum Southern domestic ideal) differed from late
twentieth-century academic communitarians. Legislators approached parental authority more instrumen-
tally, as a mechanism to enhance the overall social order, whereas communitarian proponents were more
deontological, approaching the restoration of parental authority as an intrinsic moral goal. On the
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mothers, and other at-risk parents, through parental involvement programs in
schools, in the military, and elsewhere, and through fatherhood programs and
initiatives, the state was seen to have a critical positive role in revitalizing and
recreating parental authority, enabling parents to reclaim their role as “decision
makers” and “stewards” of their children’s values, and destinies.35
Parental autonomy or authority then, within the organic family frame, was not a
separate, inherently significant, political goal but a vital part of an overarching one:
the defense of a traditional social or public order. This was repeatedly illustrated in
policy discussions regarding sex and sexuality, such as in debates over public
school mandates or programs. Here, conservative Republican legislators claimed
parents’ traditional roles as “the primary and most important teachers of values to
this Nation’s school age children”36 as the basis for their opposition to health, sex-
education, and contraceptive programs. For instance, Congressman Frank Wolf
(R-Va.) described himself as a “father of five children” and stated that “what
troubles me deeply about school-based clinics” was when a “parent sends his or
her child to school” with the “message that it’s wrong to have sex before marriage,
and then they enter this school-based clinic…and they see the nurse who is an
employee of the local government agency dispensing birth control pills or contra-
ceptives.”37 Thus, parents’ roles as autonomous decision makers, as well as the
attack on liberal state programs, were presented in terms of upholding a traditional
moral order. Parental autonomy and rights were protected only in those cases
where the parents abided by that traditionalist creed.
In numerous hearings about television and entertainment rating systems,
censorship of movies, and internet pornography, conservative legislators decried
also the “pervasive influence” of the “commercial establishment [in] American
living rooms.” Again, their charge was that this violated traditional social order and
parental autonomy, or as one witness described it, “the control of the father over
what is being viewed by his children.”38 Here too, technological change in the late
deontology of communitarian philosophy, see Don Browning, “When Theory Meets Practice,” 294–95 (see
note 23 above).
35. See, as examples of increasing testimony highlighting parents’ stewardship and decision-making
role: Statement of Elizabeth McGee, National Child Labor Committee, House Select Committee on
Children, Youth, and Families, Teen Parents and Their Children, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 81; Statement
of Elaine M. Amerson, House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Parents, the Missing Link
in Education Reform, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, 15, 17; Statement of Gen. John A. Wickham, Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Paternal Absence and Fathers’ Roles,
98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, 18.
36. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.) Chair, House Committee on Economic and Education Opportunities,
Parents, Schools and Values, 1, 41
37. House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Infancy to Adolescence: Opportunities
For Success, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, 110–11.
38. Reverend George W. Hall, Truro Episcopal Church, witness, Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, Broken Families, 270 (see note 31 above). See also these examples of other hearings on
parents and entertainment censorship: Senate Committee on the Judiciary and Committee on
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twentieth century, the growth of media, and new forms of entertainment were
highlighted as upending the otherwise organic traditional social order and the
primary (moral and autonomous) role of parents within it.
By the late twentieth century, the “organic domestic order” and its conception
of parents could no longer be realized organically and instead required active state
intervention.39 For the New Right, starting in the 1970s, the renewed focus on
parental authority and the urgent need for restoring moral parenting also entailed
the active regulation of some groups of parents. Regulation was long an important
element of the nineteenth-century Southern domestic order and points to the
artificial – even coercive – aspect of a traditional social order based on hierarchy
and designated roles, rather than on choice and consent.40 Southern legal
historians describe the “strong element of coercion that enforced inclusion in this
system. Although everyone had a place, coercion was essential to keep people in
their places.”41 They note that Southern jurists’ preoccupation with maintaining
family stability and regulating racial and gendered hierarchies, particularly in
cases of miscegenation and sexuality among poor white and black families;
continued to prevail in the post-bellum South despite the infiltration of the
contractual model of domestic relations after 1865.42
The renewed Republican interest in parents in the late twentieth century also
took different forms across different kinds of families. In the case of self-
sufficient, traditional families, conservatives focused on parents in order to
reassert parental autonomy and authority, while they called for greater regula-
tion and intervention into poor, non-traditional families. In the case of the latter,
conservative legislators and the witnesses they called stressed what they saw as
a “profound cultural confusion” among parents “about what is responsible
Governmental Affairs, Joint Hearings, Rating Video Games: A Parent’s Guide to Games, 103rd Cong., 1st
sess., 1993, 1994; Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Rating Entertainment Ratings: How Well Are
They Working for Parents and What Can Be Done to Improve them? 107th Cong., 1st sess., 2001; and Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Why the Government Should Care About Pornography: The State Interest in
Protecting Children and Families, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 2005.
39. After 1865, the end of bondage, the lynchpin of the antebellum Southern domestic order,
necessitated an enhanced “state paternalism” in which the state intervened far more extensively into
Southern households, such as through the development of external standards of parental evaluation in
child custody and protection cases. However, here too, state intervention grew significantly only in those
families, particularly those of the indigent, where parents were deemed to have failed in some way; See
Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household, 157–65 (see note 24 above).
40. The regulatory aspect of the emergent conservative parent ideal resembles the enduring
“obligation” side of the “rights” coin, as Priscilla Yamin has highlighted in the case of the political
construction of marriage in the United States. See her American Marriage: A Political Institution
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).
41. Edwards, People and their Peace, 95 (see note 25 above).
42. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household, 79–80, 176–213 (see note 24 above).
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or moral…behavior.”43 Hence, they advocated a programmatic cultivation
of traditional parental roles, their authority, and their moral stewardship on grounds
that many twentieth-century parents, notably low-income, single mothers, were
otherwise overly “self” focused.44
For example, Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) invited Michelle Simmons to testify at a
hearing on “Building Assets for Low-Income Families.” She told of her participation in
a self-employment training program and how she went from being a “hope-to-die dope
fiend, living out of a cardboard box on the streets of L.A.” to learning about and
practicing budgeting and saving, transmitting the value and discipline of savings to her
children. She recounted, “My children used to be like, ‘Ma, why are you rushing down
to the bank?’ I said, ‘because I have to get it in by the 31st.’ ” She told her children,
“ ‘You have to save every month’ ” and also observed that “they just learned discipline
from that.”45 Through programmatic intervention, voluntary as well as coercive, late
twentieth-century conservatives attempted to re-create a social order that would exhort
low-income parents, such as Michelle Simmons, to self-sufficiency, and in so doing, re-
create traditional parental roles of discipline and authority.46
Bill sponsorship data also suggest an increased regulatory element within
politicized parental ideals of the late twentieth century. Legislators have been found
to typically advance four main types of policies to address family-related problems:
welfare policies, seeking to enhance families’ economic conditions; regulatory
policies, aiming at restricting undesirable family behavior; autonomy policies, promot-
ing family self-sufficiency and independence; and finally, ascriptive policies, encoura-
ging the (white, heterosexual) traditional family through reference to biological
(“ascriptive”) characteristics, such as race, sex, sexuality, and gender.47 In the
101st–108th Congresses (1989–2004), although “parenting” emerged as a dominant
focus of the bills in all four of these categories, it did so to the greatest extent in
regulatory bills. Large proportions of those classified as welfare or autonomy bills
(28% of each) addressed the family through the frame of “parenting” and a sizeable
14% of ascriptive bills did this, too. However, among the regulatory bills, the majority
(51%) highlighted parenting as the primary topic of concern.
Just as in the antebellum Old South, in the late twentieth century, parental
coercion and regulation were as important to conservatives as were parental
43. Elizabeth A. McGee, House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Teen Parents and
Their Children, 81 (see note 35 above).
44. Denton, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Broken Families, 107 (see note 31
above).
45. Senate Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, Building
Assets for Low-Income Families, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., 2005, 5–6.
46. As Senator Santorum asserted, “families where assets are owned, children do better in school,
voting participation increases, and family stability improves,” Ibid.,157.
47. See Gwendoline Alphonso, “Hearth and Soul: Economic and Cultural Conceptions of the Family in the
Progressive Era, 1900–1920,” Studies in American Political Development 24 (2010): 206–32, at 213–19.
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autonomy and authority in defense of an idealized “organic social order.”
In myriad proposals by Republican legislators and their allies, the renewal of
parental authority meant strict regulatory control of those who did not (or could
not) follow allotted parental roles. There were proposals for wage garnishment and
other child support enforcements targeting “deadbeat dads,” bills calling for a halt
to welfare checks for single, poor (often minority) mothers who had extra-marital
births, and proposals that sought to impose work requirements for families
receiving public assistance. Several policy discussions centered on re-asserting a
strong role for the father, who was described as having better moral and financial
judgment than single, unattached mothers.48 Thus, legislators, such as Senator
Lauch Faircloth (R-N.C.), proposed welfare reform wherein “we are going to have
to almost make it…that if the father is not in the home, you do not get the
money.”49 The (Southern) organic family framework, with its emphasis on parental
and paternal authority, social order, and allotted family roles, along with parents’
autonomy and rights, thus reverberated among Republicans’ politicized ideals of
parents and in the complex ways in which parents came to be deployed in
legislative discourse and bills.
The late twentieth-century emphasis on parents in service of a traditional
social order illustrates ways in which the relationship between family and state
has both endured and changed since the immediate postwar era. In that period,
too, policymakers had been preoccupied with the regulation of “deficient”
parental behavior and the creation of welfare programs to educate and reform
deficient parents.50 Numerous “runaway pappy” bills and programs for “parent
education classes” suggest that the legislative construction and reification of
roles and ideals of parenthood were central to the politics of the family in the
decade following World War II.51 However, as seen in the bill sponsorship data
from the 1990s, in the late twentieth century the preoccupation with parents
ratcheted up particularly in regulatory family bills, with a majority of such bills
48. See for instance, Charles Ballard, President National Institute for Responsible Fatherhood, in
Responsible Fatherhood, 38–39 (see note 32 above). For other examples of Republican preferences for
traditional gender roles in family, with the wife as primary caregiver, see Dan Coats (R-Ind.), House Select
Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Absence, 2 (see note 35 above); Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.),
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Broken Families, 108–09,126–27 (see note 31 above),
on how gender role reversals result in psychosexual and gender disturbances; and personal anecdote by
Dave Weldon (R-Fla.), House Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Parents, Schools and Values, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 30.
49. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Encouraging Responsible Fatherhood, 39 (see
note 42 above).
50. Alphonso, Polarized Families, Polarized Politics, Chapter 3 (see note 9 above).
51. See, for instance, House Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary, Making
Abandonment of Dependents a Federal Crime, 81st Cong. 1st and 2nd sess., 1949, 1950; and generally,
William J. Brockelbank and Felix Infausto, Interstate Enforcement of Family Support (The Runaway Pappy
Act), (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971).
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now directed at parents. Moreover, parents also emerged as a significant focus
of autonomy policies. This demonstrates the growing overlap between parental
authority and autonomy, on the one hand, and the preservation of social order
and regulation of parental roles, on the other. These policy developments
underscore the significance of (Southern) organic domestic ideals in the late
twentieth century, wherein parental autonomy and role regulation both coex-
isted in defense of social order.
The Southern Roots of the New Right’s Family Ideals
The New Right’s turn to family and to parents, and its increasing embrace of an
organic social order coincided with changes in the Republican Party’s electoral
base, namely its shift to the South. Although scholarship is divided on the cultural
distinctiveness of the modern South,52 late twentieth-century Southerners, as a social
and electoral group, continued to share a conservative political identity, with policy
preferences distinctive from Americans in the North and Pacific Coast.53 Election
results and survey research data demonstrate racial divisions between white and
black Southerners, but they also suggest marked continuing differences between
North and South as a whole, evidencing that “Southerners as a group appear to be
more socially conservative, nationalistic, and religious than non-Southerners.… They
also seem to be better satisfied, regardless of class, race, or party, with their states
and communities than is true of other Americans.”54
In addition, Southerners have experienced, interpreted, and perceived the
breakdown of the nuclear family different than non-Southerners have.55 Scholars
have found that “the change in family structure has been most dramatic for…the
communities [in red states mostly in the South and along the southern border] that
most revolve around marriage, where divorce has consequences not just for
52. For interpretations stressing the convergence of the South with other regions see, for example,
Byron Shafer and Richard Johnston, The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change
in the Postwar South (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Sean P. Cunningham, American
Politics in the Postwar Sunbelt: Conservative Growth in a Battleground Region (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2014). For accounts emphasizing its continued distinctiveness as a region, see all the
references in note 1 above and also Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and
the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012).
53. Ann Markusen, Regions: The Economics and Politics of Territory (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1987); J.S. Hurlbert, “The Southern Region: A Test of the Hypothesis of Cultural Distinctiveness,”
Sociological Quarterly 30 (1989): 245–66.
54. Alan Abramowitz, “Ideological Realignment and the Nationalization of Southern Politics,” in
Perspectives on the American South: An Annual Review of Society, Politics and Culture, vol. 1, ed. Merle
Black and John Shelton Reed (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1981), 83–106.
55. Cahn and Carbone, Red Fs v. Blue Families, 19–32 (see note 12 above).
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individual well-being but…for the foundations of shared notions of morality.”56
Marked attachment to place, to shared identity, community, and family distinguish
southerners from other Americans,57 suggesting the ongoing resonance of the
organic family frame among them.
The increasing salience of the South and Southern family experiences to the
New Right is evidenced in the family anecdotes used by Republican legislators
during committee hearings. During committee hearings, members of Congress and
their invited witnesses frequently recount “real life” families as policy examples,
highlighting certain characteristics and circumstances of their lives, including
where they resided.58 From 1981 to 2006, Republican legislators drew on families
from the South, more than from any other region, to illustrate their policy positions,
while Democrats referred mostly to families from the North.59 Of the families
used in examples that Republicans referred to during this period, 43% lived
in the South, while 42% of family cases discussed by Democrats were
from the North; the differences in proportions were statistically significant (see
Table 1).60
Far more than in the Democrats’ anecdotes, the Republicans’ family examples
highlighted enduring family-social networks, extended kin, inherited social values,
and robust community life – all hallmarks of the socially embedded, Southern
organic family ideal. Of the family examples that discussed families’ social
connectedness, 58% of Republican cases stressed civic participation in voluntary
organizations, versus 36% of Democratic family examples. These qualities were
qualitatively epitomized in the account of family life provided by Timothy Vann, a
widowed mother of ten children (with an unusual name), whose family was
honored in 1983 by Nancy Reagan and the evangelical American Family Society as
a “Great American Family.”Mrs. Vann testified before the Senate Subcommittee on
Family and Human Services and attributed “successes and achievements made by
my family” to “…my parents, my grandparents, and my friends” and to the fact that
56. Ibid., 119 (emphasis added).
57. John Shelton Reed, “The South: What is it? Where is it?” in The South for New Southerners, ed. Paul
D. Escott and David R. Goldfield (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 18–41; also see
Dewey W. Grantham, The South in Modern America: A Region at Odds (New York: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1994), 313; Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1987), 219–29.
58. See note 9 above for case selection and methodology.
59. The coding of regions aggregates Census Divisions: where North=Census Divisions of New
England, Middle Atlantic and East North Central; South= all of Census Region of South, that is Divisions of
South Atlantic, East and West South Central; West=Mountain and West North Central Divisions; and
Pacific= Pacific Division; see: www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf ,
accessed January 16, 2016. For a similar aggregation also analyzing the significance of region to partisan
development, albeit without the inclusion of Hawaii, Alaska, or the District of Columbia, see Mellow, The
State of Disunion, 26–27 (see note 25 above).
60. The Pearson’s Chi-Square Statistic of “Region of Family Residence” with “Party of Active Member
of Congress” is 13.8, p= .003.
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“we inherited the good Southern tradition of discipline, work, respect for parents
and elderly…the teachings of love and honor for God, respect for my parents,
respect and consideration of all people, honesty, industriousness, self-reliance and
self-worth were passed to me and then, on to my children.”61
Parental authority and discipline, which also were central features of the
traditional organic family frame, have continued to be rated highly by late
twentieth-century Southerners and by Republican legislators and the witnesses
they called in congressional hearings. Survey research shows that instilling a sense
of order and respect for authority among children has been highly important to
Southern parents across socio-demographic groups, who surpass all other regional
groups in their support of the use of force to insure appropriate behavior in their
children.62 In a similar vein, Republican members of Congress constructed stern
parental authority in their family cases by stressing ideals of order and discipline.63
Table 1
Republican and Democratic Family Case Examples by Region of Family Residence,
1981–2006
Party of Active Member of Congress
Democratic Republican
Count Column N (%) Count Column N (%)
Region of Family
Residence**
North* 283 42.2 140 33.7
South* 216 32.2 179 43.0
West 81 12.1 49 11.8
Pacific 90 13.4 48 11.5
*Values in the same row are significantly different for Democratic and Republican cases at p<0.05 in the
two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Tests assume equal variances.
**χ2 statistic is significant at the 0.05 level
Source: Data compiled by author from congressional hearings. See note 14 in the text of this article for
more information about methodology
61. Senate Subcommittee on Family and Human Services of the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, Forum for Families: Quality of American Family Life, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983 (emphasis
added).
62. Clifton P Flynn, “Regional Differences in Attitudes Towards Corporal Punishment,” Journal of
Marriage and the Family 56 (1994): 314–24.
63. See, for example, Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and
Families of the Committee on Education and Workforce, School Safety, Discipline, and IDEA, 106th Cong.,
1st sess., 1999, 4, as well as many family stories, including testimony by Christopher Lyle in House
Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the Committee on Education and Workforce,
School Violence: Views of Students and The Community, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 1999.
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In fact, members of both parties in recent Congresses have drawn an increasing
share of their family examples from the South, suggesting the rising salience of the
South to both parties’ policy ideologies in the late twentieth century. While the
number of family stories from the South remained relatively high, those from the
North declined precipitously beginning in the mid-1990s, when the Republicans
issued their Contract with America and took control of Congress (see Figure 2).
More generally, the salience of Southern families in policy discourse strongly
matches the shifting electoral fortunes of the Republican Party in Congress,
suggesting the centrality of Southern families to Republicans’ policy agenda, much
more than for the Democratic Party. As Reagan Republicans, such as Senator
Denton from Alabama or Frank Wolf from Virginia, entered Congress in the
early 1980s (in the 97th–99th Congresses), the largest proportion of total family
examples discussed during hearings hailed from the South. Again, at the height of
Republican strength, when Republicans dominated both chambers in Congress
(in the 104–106th Congresses, 1996–2002), families from the South and the
Mountain West (i.e., the so-called red states), were again those most often referred
to in policy debates, indicating their enhanced political value to the Republican
coalition.
Figure 2
Region of Families Referenced in Hearings, 97th-109th Congresses (1981–2006)
Source: Data compiled by author. See note 14 above in the text of this article for more information about
methodology.
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In contrast, in the mid-1980s to early 1990s, when Democrats and Republicans
battled for control over the two chambers in Congress, family examples from the blue
states of the North and Pacific Coast were referred to in numbers comparable to those
from the red, Southern andMountain, states. Thus, data on the use of family examples
in hearings empirically demonstrate that families from the South, although increas-
ingly referred to by legislators from both parties in the last decade of the twentieth
century, had the greatest political value for Republican legislators, since their prese-
nce in congressional hearings ebbed and flowed depending on Republican strength
in Congress. The resurgence of parents as a political ideal was part of this increasing
southernization of Republican family ideology and the exportation of policies and
ideas from the South to the national electorate and American party politics.
Conclusions
This article has presented a family-centered account of the Republican Southern
strategy of the late twentieth century. By invoking the organic family frame and its
autonomous yet regulated parent subject, New Right Republican legislators increas-
ingly accommodated the family policy ideals of the Southern electorate. Family
served as the ideational site or terrain that shaped and facilitated the southernization
of political change within the Republican Party. By focusing on ideational and
discursive innovations as the locus of significant partisan shifts, my account
contributes to recent innovations in scholarship on American political development
that do not solely focus on institutions and governance structures, but highlight
instead the significance of language, ideas, and culture in influencing political
change.64 Family ideals, although mediated by institutional contexts (such as party
structures) play a decisive role in shaping political party development.
Also significant for the American political development literature is the
demonstration of family as both a public and private institution, whose public or
political value depends on private family experiences as seen through the family
examples cited by legislators during committee hearings. I present the political
development of family as the outcome of social (family demographic) and political
(party) institutional dynamics. With the revival of Southern organic family ideals in
the late twentieth century, the blurring of public and private family boundaries in
public policy became all the more vivid, as conservative policymakers’ concern to
uphold private parental rights and autonomy occurred at the same times that they
64. See, for example, Rogers M. Smith, Political Peoplehood: The Roles of Values, Interests, and
Identities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015): also, Victoria Hattam and Joseph Lowndes, “The
Ground Beneath Our Feet: Language, Culture, and Political Change,” in Formative Acts: American Politics
in the Making, ed. Stephen Skowronek and Matthew Glassman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2007), 199–219.
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attempted to harness the public regulation of parental roles and parental
autonomy in defense of a public social order.
Additionally, this account complicates the picture of the Republican Southern
strategy as merely an elite-driven phenomenon formulated by conservative
political strategists and evangelical leaders. It instead underscores the importance
of the Southern social context in which organic family ideals had long been
prevalent – and without which the very politicization of conservative family ideals
by the New Right would not have been viable. Family political ideals are rooted in
distinct social realities, and overlooking their social contexts misses the lived
regionalism that underlies partisan family appeals and political strategies. As the
Republican Party moved south, it increasingly incorporated Southern family
experiences to craft its policy agenda, while Democratic legislators, although
acknowledging Southern families, continued to rely mostly on examples of
families in the postindustrial Northeast.
The entrenchment of political family ideals within differing social realities has
broader implications for twenty-first century social policy. To the extent that lived
family experiences, and imbricated family values, in Red and Blue America
continue to diverge, as most experts predict they will, the analysis here suggests that
the parties will remain firmly polarized in their policy preferences and agendas.
Public policy literature that focuses on family and social policy must take this
sectional reality into consideration when suggesting new policy directions.
Finally my analysis suggests that the resurgence and politicization of parents
was an important part of a family-centered Republican Southern strategy, coin-
cident to family demographic change. Conventional explanations of party change
limit their analysis to shifts in income distribution, immigration, and race within the
American electorate.65 Family change, in terms of its form and/or conceptualiza-
tion, plays almost no role in these accounts, and family policy ideals are often
subsumed into the catch-all category of emergent “social” issues. This contribution
hopes to begin to fill this gap by placing “family,” as a policy and ideological issue,
at the heart of late twentieth-century party politics and development.
Gwendoline M. Alphonso is Assistant Professor of Politics at Fairfield University.
She has published articles in Studies in American Political Development, the
Journal of Policy History, the Journal of Southern Legal History, Children and
Youth During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era (ed. James Marten, NYU Press,
2015), and in several law journals. Her forthcoming book, Polarized Families,
Polarized Parties, demonstrates the central role of family in shaping political party
development across the twentieth century.
65. See, for example, Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Dynamics of American Political Parties
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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